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RECENT DECISIONS
WILLS-REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION OF WILL TO PROBATE-
QUANTUM OF PROOF
Upon a hearing to admit a will to probate, two of the three at-
testing witnesses asserted that the testator neither signed nor acknowl-
edged his signature in their presence and that they did not recall seeing
his signature on the will. The third witness testified that the testator and
the three witnesses were all present in a group when the testator signed,
followed by the three witnesses, and that the testator was then of full
age, sound mind and memory and not under any restraint. The will was
complete and regular on its face. The Probate Court's refusal to admit
the will to probate was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Held, 4-3,
where a purported will apparently complies with all formalities on its
face, a probate court may not determine as a fact whether such will has
been attested and executed according to law, but is merely required to
determine whether there is substantial evidence tending to prove such
fact, i.e., evidence which will enable a finding of that fact by reasonable
minds. In re Estate of Lyons, 166 Ohio St. 207, 141 N.E. 2d 151
(1957).
This inquiry will be limited to problems concerning the admission
of a will to probate, arising from the following statutory provision:
The probate court shall admit a will to probate if it ap-
pears that such will was attested and executed according to law
.and if it appears that the testator at the time of executing
such will was of full age, of sound mind and memory, and
not under restraint.1 (Emphasis added.)
It is important to distinguish the matter of admission to probate from a
contest action, which is a jury proceeding in the Common Pleas Court
to contest the validity of a will which has already been admitted to
probate.
2
In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon In re Vill of
Hathaway3 and In re Will of Elvin,4 and upon its interpretation of the
applicable statutory provisions. The Hathaway case holds that for a will
to be admissible to probate, the evidence need show only a prima fade
I OHIo REV. CoDe §2107.18 (1953). As to the formal requirements for execu-
tion, "Except oral wills, every last will and testament . . .shall be signed at the
end by the party making it .. .and be attested and subscribed in the presence of
such party, by two or more competent witnesses who saw the testator subscribe,
or heard him acknowledge his signature." OHIo REV. CODE §2107.03 (1953).
2 A recent amendment to the Probate Code accentuates this distinction:
"If it appears that the instrument purporting to he a will is not entitled to probate,
the court shall enter an interlocutory order denying probate of such instrument and
shall continue the matter for further hearing. . . .Thereupon, the court shall
revoke its interlocutory order denying probate to such instrument and admit the
same to probate or enter a final order refusing to probate such instrument. A final
order refusing to probate such instrument may be reviewed on appeal." OHIO REV.
CODE .2107.1l81. (Emphasis added.)
34 Ohio St. 384 (1854).
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case in favor of its validity. In the Elvin case, after the two attesting
witnesses said that the testatrix was under undue influence when she
executed the will, the Probate Court found that the testatrix was under
restraint and refused to admit the will to probate. After noting the
presence of some favorable evidence in the record, the Supreme Court
observed that there arose an inference that the testatrix acted of her own
volition, and reversed the Probate Court on the principle that:
A prima fade case in favor of the validity of the will is
all that is required, and when all the evidence shows as a
matter of law that such a case is made out, the court must
admit the will to probate, even though the evidence is con-
flicting.5
Equating "prima facie case in favor of validity" with "evidence which
will enable a finding of that fact by reasonable minds," and concluding
that no words of the statute purported to give any authority to the
Probate Court to determine as a fact whether a will has been properly
attested and executed, the majority in the principal case reversed the
Probate Court for acting as a trier of fact in disbelieving the third wit-
ness, instead of admitting the will to probate on the ground that reason-
able minds could have believed him.
The dissenting opinion properly questions the meaning of the
clause "if it appears" as used in the applicable statutes,6 for the inter-
pretation of this clause is the key to the decision. Revised Code Section
2107.181 was enacted in 1953 to obviate uncertainty created by the old
law under which it was possible for an estate to be completely adminis-
tered as an intestate estate only to have the administration set aside years
later and the estate readministered under the will.7 Although this
section provides for a "final order" by the probate court, it does nothing
to alter the standard by which the court is to govern its action; indeed,
it merely borrows the ambiguous wording "if it appears" from Revised
Code Section 2107.18,8 which sets forth the requirements for admission
to probate.
The dissent seeks to distinguish the Elivn case, relied upon by the
majority, by pointing out that it dealt with the question of undue in-
fluence whereas the instant case concerns the formal requisites of a will.
Not only was the principle enunciated by the court in that case broad
enough to cover the present facts, but it is also supported by a long line
of authority following Hathaway:
All that can be required on probate is a "prima fade
case," and when such "appears" by substantial evidence the
4 146 Ohio St. 448, 66 N.E. 2d 629 (1946).
5 Id. at 454, 66 N.E. 2d at 632.
6 Supra notes 1 and 2.
7 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 373 (1953).
8 This does not change the superseded General Code section "in any material
respect." In re Schulz' Estate, 102 Ohio App. 486, 492, 136 N.E. 2d 730, 735 (1956).
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duty is mandatory on the part of the probating court to admit
the will to probate. ... '
The dissent further suggests that the words "if it appears" con-
template the exercise of judgment by the probate court. This is certainly
true, but the judgment simply consists of determining whether there is
sufficient evidence tending toward the validity of the will to justify a
finding of validity by reasonable minds. As its final observation, the
dissent contends that Revised Code Section 2107.181 "contemplates
more than just listening on the part of the probate judge." This formu-
lation does not diminish the validity of the conclusion, set forth above,
that the purpose of this section is to forestall further cases of readminis-
tration under a will after a complete intestate administration. The
majority further refutes the dissent's position here, observing that this
section does not purport to give the Probate Court authority to determine
as a fact whether a will has been properly executed, and that it would
be difficult to conclude that the legislature intended to do so since no
notice is provided for "the kinds of persons who might be adversely
affected by the will," and no appeal is provided from an order admitting
it to probate.
A better understanding of the application of the principles involved
may be furthered by a brief consideration of the requisite quantum of
proof in specific instances. In In re Schulz' Estatel0 attesting witness A
stated that she did not know she was signing a will and did not see the
testator or witness B sign. Witness B said that she could not remember
the occasion but had often witnessed wills for her husband, an attorney,
and had made it a practice never to sign unless she saw the testator sign.
The Probate Court's denial of admission of the will to probate was
reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the presumption of
due execution which arises on proof of the signatures accompanied by a
complete attestation clause is very strong:
It was not necessary in order to probate this will that
both attesting witnesses orally testify that all of the statutory
requirements regarding the execution of the will had been
complied with; but where, as here, all signatures to the in-
strument are genuine, the attesting clause is in due form, and
there is oral testimony by one of the witnesses that she knew it
was the will of the testatrix she was signing, and the testatrix
was of full age, of sound mind and memory and not under
any restraint, a pinrin facie case is established."
9 McWilliams v. Central Trust Co., 51 Ohio App. 246, 250, 200 N.E. 532, 554
(1935). Accord, Roosa v. Wiekward, 90 Ohio App. 213, 105 N.E. 2d 454 (1950);
In re Schulz' Estate, 102 Ohio App. 486, 136 N.E. 2d 730 (1956) ; In re Blickens-
derfer, 28 Ohio Op. 42, 13 Ohio Supp. 93 (C. P. 1944); In re Will of Watts,
19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 27 Ohio Dec. 87 (C.P. 1916); In re Wood's Will,
67 N.E. 2d 11 (Ohio Prob. 1945); In re Halterman, 27 Ohio Op. 521, 12 Ohio
Supp. 150 (Prob. 1943).
10 102 Ohio App. 486, 136 N.E. 2d 730 (1956).
'l Id. at 492, 136 N.E. 2d at 735.
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In In re Wood's Will 2 the court held that it could give full weight to
the testimony of one witness to the will, disregarding the testimony of
the other, and proceeded to order the will probated on the basis of the
testimony of one witness. In the absence of testimony of attestation,
it will be presumed that the testator signed in the presence of the wit-
nesses or acknowledged his signature to them.'3 If no legal disability is
affirmatively shown, it will be presumed that a decedent had the capacity
to make a will and that it was made free from restraint, thus establishing
a prima facie case of legal responsibility. 4
The ease with which a prima facie case may be established is em-
phasized by Roosa v. Wickward.'3 The will in that case met all the
statutory requirements on its face but the only surviving witness testified
that she did not see the testator's signature when she signed and could
not have seen it because of the manner in vhich the paper was folded,
and that the other witness was not there when she signed. The Probate
Court was reversed for refusing to admit the will to probate as not
executed according to law, the Court of Appeals saying:
It appears the Probate Court did not confine its considera-
tion to whether a prima facie case in favor of the validity of
the will has been established, but went beyond that field of
inquiry into one reserved for ultimate determination by a jury
under the lawof contest.
An analysis of the cases shows that if the will as introduced is in
proper form and the signatures have been proved, the slightest additional
evidence in favor of the will's validity will suffice to make a prima facie
case thereof in spite of damaging evidence to the contrary, even if
offered by one or more of the attesting witnesses. If this generalization
is accurate, the testimony of the third witness in the instant case, com-
bined with the introduction of a will in proper form and with proof of
the signatures, constituted prima facie proof, notwithstanding that the
other two witnesses presented a totally conflicting picture of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the will's execution.
In light of the preceding considerations, it is clear that the decision
in the principal case properly reconciles the existing case and statutory
law on the matter, presenting sound principles upon which the probate
judge may ground his action, to wit: he must admit the will to probate
unless he determines as a matter of law that there- is no evidence upon
which reasonable minds could base a finding of validity.
Wayman C. Lawrence III
12 67 N.E. 2d. 11 (Ohio Prob. 1945). Accord, In re Will of Watts, supra
note 9.
13 Carpenter v. Denoon, 29 Ohio St. 379 (1876).
14Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (192S); In re Stocker,
26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 112 (Prob. 1926).
15 90 Ohio App. 213, 105 N.E. 2d 454 (1950).
16 Id. at 219, 105 N.E. 2d at 458. -
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